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A MONETARIST INTERPRETATION OF INFLATION 
IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN 
By Robert E. Looney 
Inflation poses a grave threat to any political system. It does 
so because it succeeds in touching the lives of the ordinary 
citizen - not some, but all - in a way in which government 
development expenditures are rarely able. Whether it is hyper-
inflation or gradual increases in prices over time, the damage 
done to the individual and society is evident. By creating an 
atmosphere of insecurity and futility, by permitting wholesale 
economic injustice and by giving rise to abject poverty, an en-
vironment is created which makes for irrationality in politics(!) 
and thereby deeply affects the nature and effectiveness of sub-
sequent stabilization measures. 
In retrospect the development of inflation in Iran, especially 
after 197 3, together with the government's inability to stabilize 
the price level, undoubtedly was a major factor contributing 
to the success of the revolution against the Shah's government. 
Green has noted that by 1977 (2) 
... the problem was not purely political, but rather an 
outgrowth of the rapid decline in the Shah's development 
planning. As I argued earlier, the crisis of participation was 
transformed into a crisis of the system as a whole, in part 
as a consequence of the country's deteriorating economic 
situation. High inflation, unemployment and other issues 
ignited the population, not merely desires for greater 
political participation. 
The nature of the Iranian inflation and the course of inflation 
related variables therefore merit considerable attention. In the 
following analysis particular emphasis is given to Iranian infla-
tion in the 1970s, with an attempt made to identify the type 
and source of the inflation experienced. 
In particular, an attempt will be made to test the monetarist 
approach to inflation in Iran. As will be shown in more vigorous 
fashion below, this approach is a logical one to use in examining 
price movements in pre-revolutionary Iran. First, the economy 
was relatively small in the sense that prices of goods and capital 
were determined in world markets, and over these Iran had 
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little control. Second, even though Iran was considered a less 
developed country in the 1960s and 1970s, the country did 
have a relatively advanced financial sector headed by a central 
bank which over most of the period under examination, was 
responsible for influencing the external balance (the balance of 
payments) as well as domestic credit conditions. Thus, Iran 
provides not only the conditions necessary for testing a mone-
tary model but also provides some interesting insights into the 
model's policy implications, especially with regard to the 
ment's stabilization efforts. 
Inflationary Pressures - Overview 
The Iranian economy enjoyed a prolonged period of price 
stability through the 1960s. Beginning in 1972, howeve;r" grow-
ing inflationary pressures developed and were present through-
out the rest of the 1970s. During the Fourth Five Year Plan 
(1968-72), the annual rates of increase in the average level of 
consumer prices were low, ranging from 1 to 6 percent (Table 
1 ). The corresponding rates of inflation for the Fifth Plan were 
on the other hand, all in excess of 10 percent, amounting to as 
much as 27 percent in 1977. 
A comparison of the rate of increase in the money supply 
(Table 1) and that of the major inflation indices indicates that 
in the post-1973 period the Iranian economy had advanced 
beyond its absorptive .capacity in the sense of finding the 
complementary factors of production (such as human skills, 
natural resources, and infrastructure) to be put to work along-
side the rapid increase in financial resources. Apparently, 
injections of oil revenues beyond a certain level - that level 
being the annual absorptive capacity - only led to higher infla-
tionary pressures with little or no corresponding increase in 
output resulting from this expenditure. 
The evidence for Iran during the post-1972 p~riod suggests 
a tendency to try to do too much in too short a time. (3) The 
problem was aggravated by the jump in international inflation 
rates during 1973-74. Yet it would be a mistake to suggest that 
the observed rates of domestic inflation were due to purely 
international factors. On the contrary most studies on the sub-
ject indicate that in general international price increases contri-
buted no more than 25 percent to domestic inflation in devel-
oping countries, leaving a substantial portion to be accounted 
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for by domestic factors. 
Most domestic sources of the inflationary pressure build up 
in the mid-1970s can be traced to the decision to revise the 
Fifth Five Year Plan following the oil price increases. At that 
time, total investment projected for the duration of the plan 
was doubled and vast amounts allocated to social welfare and 
subsidy programs. Within the framework of the Fifth Plan the 
government's expenditures for 1974 were tripled compared to 
those in 1973. Of the total government budget for 1974 (Rls, 
254 billion), only 28 percent went into fixed capital formation, 
whereas 58 percent was sperit on current expenditures. The 
remaining 14 percent went for other payments which, for all 
practical purposes, were very similar to current expenditures. 
This unprecedented expansion in government expenditures 
created a corresponding expansion of liquidity. The result was 
a rapid increase in effective demand. One net impact of the 
government's fiscal actions was the creation of an economic 
environment whereby producers were encouraged to make the 
utmost use of their means of production. Another consequence 
was that traders responded quickly by increasing imports to 
balance supply with demand. As a result, the demand for means 
of production and for primary and intermediate goods increased 
while simultaneously the available infrastructural facilities were 
used at maximum capacity. However, due to the general short-
age of skilled workers and infrastructure capacity in certain key 
areas, the supply of domestically produced goods could not 
increase at the same rate as the demand. Inflationary pressures, 
therefore, mounted while at the same time the feedback effect 
of the oil price increases - an acceleration in world inflation -
resulted in increased import prices. 
Initially, the greatest inflationary pressures were concen-
trated in the construction and housing sector. Both the rapid 
increase in incomes and the increasing migration from rural to 
urban areas played an important role in creating shortages of 
not only available living quarters but construction materials 
(which was already evident prior to the Fifth Development 
Plan). The result was a sharp escalation in the price of land, 
construction materials, and wages of construction workers. In 
turn, the acceleration of inflation in the construction and 
housing sector spilled over to other sectors, finally increasing 
inflationary pressures in all other activities of the economy. 
TABLE 1 
IRAN: GROWTH OF MONETARY AGGREGATES: MEASURES OF INFLATION 
(Average Annual Rate} 
~ - -
Ml M2 M3 M4 CPI WPI GD::>DF 
1960 11.50 
- - -
10.04 3.15 3.04 
1961 -16.73 - - - 3.17 1 .. 28 2. 14 1962 22.72 24.94 
- -
0.72 1.27 -0.26 
1963 12.96 16.22 
- -
0.17 0.18 0.79 
1964 10.98 13. 81 
- -
4.11 4.64 l.83 
• I 
1965 12.87 13.01 13.30 13.09 2.06 3.33 . -2. 31 
1966 10.07 12.48 13.83 11.19 -0.34 -1.18 -0. 52 . 
1967 14.92 16.07 16.48 16.35 1.52 0. 17 -0. 79 
1968 7.86 13.43 12.09 14.89 0.67 0.66 0.53 
1969 6.07 15.07 14.76 17.94 3.64 2.61 0.52 
1970 12.78 15. 23 16.36 19.06 l.59 2.84 0.52 
1971 17. 17 19.36 19.82 18.33 4.24 5.79 7.27 
1972 27.71 26.07 26.89 21.28 6.49 5.46 6.78 
• 1973 22.93 23.25 24.93 25.35 9.76 10.11 31.79 
1974 27.09 29.97 36.11 37.27 14. 30 14.47 55.67 
1975 16.76 25.79 21.59 25.09 12.74 7.40 10.38 
1976 44.25 44.88 42.53 42.34 11.29 8.26 16.90 
1977 -23.0l -26.09 -25. 77 -25.70 27.31 14.65 19.50 
Source: Computed from: Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report, various issl)es; International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial·Statistics, various issues. 
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As bottlenecks began to develop, the time lag in converting 
financial capital into productive capital lengthened, further 
impeding the adjustment of supply to demand, with increased 
shortages of materials and skilled labor. Many projects, both 
public and private, were not completed despite the fact that in 
many cases the budgets for these projects were actually spent. 
At the same time, a considerable volume of goods ordered from 
abroad did not arrive on time. As a result of these factors, 
aggregate supply was never able to catch up with aggregate 
demand during the Fifth Plan, the adjustment between demand 
and supply taking place instead through price increases. 
Needless to say, the overspending of financial resources 
represented not only a loss in real resources with intertemporal 
implications, but also set in motion a series of inflationary 
pressures which were difficult to halt without the eventual 
resort to fairly drastic restrictive measures. The real resources 
lost - real in the sense that they represented an equivalent in 
~xported barrels of oil - were resources that could have been 
used in the future to expand the country's productive capacity 
at a time when the relationship between the economy's annual 
financial inflow and annual absorptive capacity would permit it. 
When used in the present, as was the case, these resources were 
simply dissipated in the form of higher prices. 
Other sources of inflation are of course logically possible and 
not inconsistent with the data on price changes that is available 
for this period. 
While few would challenge in principle, the broad interpreta-
tion of Iranian inflation outlined above, its high level of general-
ity makes it of somewhat limited use in evaluating the effective-
ness of the government's anti-inflation programs. 
The increase in the rate of inflation in the first half of the 
1970s together with the government's seeming inability to 
stabilize the price level dramatized the need for a deeper under-
standing of the country's inflationary process. Something of a 
debate concerning the precise cause of the rapidly accelerating 
price level transpired during this period. In particular the role 
of money and of monetary policy in controlling increases in 
domestic price was a commonly debated topic in planning 
areas.(4) 
TABLE 1 
IRAN: GROWTH OF MONETARY AGGREGATES: MEASURES OF INFLATION 
{Average Annua1 Rate} 
--- r--
Ml M2 M3 M4 CPI WPI GD?DF 
1960 11.50 - - - 10.04 3.15 3.04 1961 -16.73 - - - 3.17 1 .. 28 2. 14 
1962 22. 72 24.94 
- -
0.72 l. 27 -0.26 
1963 12.96 16.22 
- -
0.17 0.18 0.79 
1964 10.98 13. 81 
- -
4.11 4.64 1.83 
1965 12.87 13. 01 13.30 13.09 2.06 3.33 -2. 31 
1966 10.07 12.48 13.83 11.19 -0.34 -1. 18 -0. 52 . 
1967 14.92 16.07 16.48 16.35 1.52 o. 17 -0.79 
1968 7.86 13. 43 12.09 14.89 0.67 0.66 0.53 
1969 6.07 15.07 14.76 17.94 3.64 2. 61 0.52 
1970 12.78 15. 23 16.36 19.0o 1.59 2.84 0.52 
1971 17 .17 19.36 19.82 18.33 4.24 5.79 7.27 
!' . 1972 27. 71 26.07 26.89 21.28 6.49 5.46 6.78 1973 22.93 23.25 24.93 25.35 9.76 10. 11 31.79 1974 27.09 29.97 36.11 37.27 14.30 14.47 55.67 
1975 16.76 25.79 21.59 25.09 12.74 7 .40 10.38 
1976 44.25 44.88 42.53 42.34 11.29 8.26 16.90 
1977 -23.01 -26.09 -25. 77 -25.70 27.31 14.65 19.50 
Source: Computed from: Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report, various iss1,1es; International Monetary 
Fond, International Financial·Statistics, various issues. 
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Role of Money 
The role of money ( 5) and monetary policy has of course 
been one of the ·often debated issues not only in Iran but in 
most developing countries for a long time. Despite Schumpe-
ter's ( 6) dramatization of money and credit as a "phenomenon 
of development," the nature of monetary policy remained indis-
tinct and ill-defined in Iran for two reasons. for one thing mone-
tary policy was viewed in a narrow perspective as influencing 
aggregate spending via the regulation of interest rates, credit 
availability and credit allocation. For another, views on the role 
of money and monetary policy were dominated by the then 
prevailing perception by the government of the growth process 
itself, which had not assigned a meaningful function to money 
but rather emphasized the role of oil-financed physical capital 
accumulation. 
The lack of interest in Iran in monetary aggregates and mone-
tary control largely stemmed the excessive preoccupation of 
the economic policy makers with techniques of monetary 
management, reflecting an emphasis on cyclical rather than 
long run objectives, and on the deficiencies of these techniques 
for Iran. (7) For instance it was not considered effective for the 
central bank to manipulate bank (discount) rates as an instru-
ment of policy because there were no market instruments or 
traditions among banks to react to bank rate changes in a 
definite and predictable fashion: open market operations 
were not thought to be feasible because there were insufficent 
government bonds for the Bank Markazi buy and sell on a large 
scale. (8) 
Clearly, the issue of whether Iran's inflation was the conse-
quence of the upward push of costs or the upward pull of 
demand on prices is important largely from the difference 
between the recommendations for anti-inflationary policy; 
i.e., the demand-pull explantion leading to the recommendation 
of monetary restraint and controlled levels of government 
expenditure, and the cost-push explanation leading to the 
rejection of macroeconomic measures of this sort in favor of 
policies related to tethe process of price formation and wage 
determination. 
The difference in policy recommendations was not entirely a 
difference between right wing conservative and liberal techno-
cratic solutions. Nevertheless~ the two schools of thought did 
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differ fundamentally over policy, one school (the monetarist) 
recommending measures involving a higher volume of unem-
ployment in order to stop inflation, ( 5) the other (the govern-
ment) preferring repressive measures that sought to restrain 
inflation without sacrificing growth or unemployment (both 
schools were united in their belief that inflation should be 
stopped, a conviction that became increasingly strong by 
1977). 
As in many instances in Iran, the economic issues surround-
ing the control of inflation became so closely bound up with 
political issues that, for some writers at least, it is difficult to 
determine whether the economic analysis preceded the policy 
recommendations or vice versa. Rather than survey the writings 
of each position therefore, the key aspects of both will be 
referred to selectively in the discussion that follows. 
Suffice it say that in terms of numbers, those who thought 
that attempts to control the money supply were a useful and 
production endeavor were quite in the minority. The pre-
dominent view among most officials in the country was that the 
scope for demand management was severely limited for two 
reasons: 
1. The nonpolicy disturbances to which monetary policy 
must respond invariably originated in the supply side (weather, 
bad crops, etc.) or abroad (changes in oil revenues) so that 
policy efforts to change domestic demand were of little or no 
consequence in their net effect on output and employment. 
Instead, the conventional wisdom in Iran was that the country's 
employment and growth was more closely related to the pace 
and nature of the economic development budget contained in 
the five year plan; i.e., the state of aggregate demand was given 
little recognition in this regard. 
2. Coordinating supply and demand (equating savings and 
investments, etc.) is the central task of markets. The more 
complex an economy becomes (i.e., the more indirect are the 
economic relationships between members of a society), the 
more difficult this coordinating task is and the more sensitive 
these relationships are to disturbances. Here the conventional 
wisdom maintained that because the economy was by its very 
nature relatively uncomplex in this sense (retaining a high 
degree of barter), the coordination of supply and demand was 
without meaning, and consequently attempts to "fine tune" 
TABLE 3 
TRAN: MONETARY DETERMINANTS. OF INFLATION. 1959· 1977 
Dependent lnde~endent.Variables 
Interce2t r2 Eguat1on Vatfalile GM2L GM2[2 INFC[ GNOXNP WINF GM2 ZAG oT~~x~[ F 
INFC 0.80 -9.19 
(0.03) (-6.09) 0.928 142.51 
2 INFC 0.67 0.26 . -11. 42 
(7·. 17) (l. 72) (-6.01) 0.945 85.40 
3 INFC 0.50 0.51 -0.09 -10.87 (3.67) (2.48) (-1.66), (-6.09) 0.958 67.82 
4 INFC 0.76 0.59 -0.57 -16.15 (8.39) (2.91) (-2.12) (-5.83) 0.963 78.31 
5 INFC 0.93 -0.63 0. 12 -7.20 (10.16) (-1.93) (1. 74), (-3.30) 0.950 56.51 
6 INFC 0.61 0.4T -0.41 0.10 -8.98 (7.57) (2.96) (-2.53) (1.20) (-5. 05) 0.972 68. 77 
7 INfG 0.75 0.62 -0.61 0.14 -16.78 (9.06) (3.34) (-2.66) ( 1. 71) (-6.61) 0.973 71.92 
8 !NFC 0.65 0.31 0.07 -40.88 -9.55 
(7 .49) (2.19) (0. 70) (-1.81) (-4.83) 0.964 53.40 
9 INFC 0.86 0.69 -0.62 -0.17 0.007 10.26 (-1.01) (2.36) (-2.09) (-1. 21) (-0.51) (3.20) 0.118 1.47 
10 INFC 0.81 0.01 -9.47 (10.66) (0.20) (-4.54) 0.929 65.06 
11 INFC 0.65 0.23 0.002 -10.62 (2. 92) ( 1. 03) (0.14) (-1.74) 0.945 51.35 
Note: See text for identification of symbols. 
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demand by the authorities would be of little avail. 
The Monetarist Approach to Inflation 
95 
The monetary approach to inflation in Iran starts with the 
fundamental proposition that inflation is merely an interaction 
of market supply and demand for money. Put differently, 
price movements are viewed by this model as systematically 
dependent upon current and immediate past evolutions of 
the interaction between supply and demand conditions. 
The starting point of this analysis is the basic monetarist 
model derived from the equation of exchange. (9) More specif-
ically, assume a simple money demand function of the foilow-
ing form: 
(1) M/PY = yacb 
where M is the (exogenously determined) nominal stock of 
money; P is the price, and Y is a measure of real income, and C 
is the expected cost of holding real balances. Equation (1) is 
solved for P and expressed in terms of growth rates (or depicted 
by G prefixing the variable): (2) INF= RM- (1-a)GY - bGC. 
Equation (2) incorporates the basic elements of the monetar-
ist approach to inflation: money, real income, and the expected 
cost of holding real balances. In addition, this formulation 
captures the basic methodological bias of the monetarist school; 
i.e., the equation has a limited number of variables, and the 
nature of relationships is clear and straightforward. The growth 
of money relative to output and cost of holding real balances 
will generate an increase in the rate of inflation. The growth of 
real income will cause decreases in the rate of inflation '(via 
absorbing money in the increased demand for real balances). 
Similarly, the rate of inflation is assumed to be inversely related 
to the expected cost of holding real balances. 
Equation (2) assumes instantaneous adjustment of monetary 
changes and no money illusion. Therefore, the tested form of 
the monetarist equation is: 
INF - a+ alGM + a2GML + GML2 - GNOXNP + EXP 
where GNOXNP is growth of real non-oil income; GML is the 
growth of the money supply lagged one year; GML2 is the 
growth in the money supply lagged two years, and EXP is some 
measure of inflationary expectations. · 
The basic monetarist contention is: 1) that the causal rela-
tion runs from money to prices and output; 2) any persistent 
TABLE 2 
?RAN: MONETARY DETERMINANTS OF INFLATION, 1959-1972 
Dependent lndeeendent Var1ab1es 2· Eguat1on Variable ~M2[ . GM~L2 INFCL GNOXNP WINF GM2 ZAG DINOXPL Interce2t r F 
INFC 0.66 -7.01 (2.19) (-1.62) 0.445 4.81 
2 INFC o •. 62 0.85 • -19.00 (2.79) (2.46) (-3.28) 0.749 7.45 
3 INFC 0.05 0.62 0.36 -13.21 
0.26 (3.39) (3.94) (-4.03) 0.949 24.68 
4 INFC 0.87 1.07 -0.61 -24.64 (4.02) (3.62) (-1.99) (-4.57) 0.874 9.24 
5 INFC 0.55 -0.47 0.34 -6.77 ( 1. 32) (-1.92) (2.50) (-2.30) 0.897 11.60 
6 INFC 0.71 1.01 -0.81 0.26 -21.70 (3.62) (4.23) (-3.04) ( 1.82) (-4.73) 0.940 11.80 
7 INF"c 0.53 1.09 -0.04 -64.39 -17.00 (2.14) (3;20) (-0.23) (-1.93) (-2.88) 0.892 6.17 
8 INFC 0.45 0.70 -0.41 0.043 -12.42 ( 1. 48) (2.16) (-1. 49) (1.73) (-1.49) 0.937 11.15 
9 INF(4 0.47 -4.63 (4.88) (:3.08) 0.799 23.89 
10 HlFC, -0.80 0.47 -3.94 (-0.26) (3.00) (-1.25) 0.802 10.12 
11 !NFC 0.15 0.44 0.05 -4.e9 (0.58) (l.41) (2.27) (-O.C4) 0.890 10.83 
Note: See text for identification of symbols. 
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increase in money relative to output is a sufficient condition for 
inflation; 3) the magnitude and length of inflation is dependent 
on the. magnitude and persistence of monetary growth; 4) the 
occurrence of inflation is independent of the level of employ-
ment in the economy, and 5) it is the increasing growth rate of 
money which yields inflationary pressures. 
The results of the monetary regressions on the rate of in-
crease in the consumer price index indicate that the monetarist 
model performs extremely well. Both the growth in Ml and M2 
were used, with M2 performing slightly better. M2 by itself, 
however, is not significant when lagged one year. 
GM2L is highly significant explaining nearly 45 percent of 
the observed rate of inflation (equation 7, Table 2). When 
combined with MG2L2, expected inflation INFC (lagged one 
year) and world inflation WINF, GM2L explains 94 percent of 
the variance in INFX. In general, the growth of world prices 
gives somewhat better results than world inflation lagged one 
year. The growth in non-oil GDP does not significantly contri-
bute to the regression equation when introduced with lagged 
GM2 nor does the deviation from the trend of real non-oil 
income. 
Openness measures (ZLON) are significant and of the right 
sign when regressed with GM2L and GM2L2. They are right 
on the border of acceptability, however, but do improve the 
r2 somewhat further. 
The negative sign on the inflationary expectation term 
(INFCL) as proxied by last year's rate of inflation is of interest 
and has certain implications for monetary policy. The negative 
sign indicates that, with increased inflation, individuals may 
have actually increased their holdings of money. An apparently 
irrational move since inflation was eroding the value of these 
holdings at the time. This however can to some extent be ex-
plained by the financial structure of the country, which can be 
characterized by;(lO) 
1. greater reliance of firms on internal financing than 
on the issuance of new securities; 
2. only limited activity in the domestic stock exchange 
with new securities being mainly purchased by the finan-
cial institutions rather than the non-bank private sector, 
and; 
3. deposits with the monetary system constituting the 
• 
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major portion of the public's claims on the financial inter-
mediaries. 
The lack of developed markets where borrowers and lenders 
could interact directly, together with a lack of confidence in 
the stability of the country's financial markets and the inade-
quacy of government regulations for dealing with fraud in the 
stock markets apparently made broad money (M2) the most 
desirable asset to hold during this period. The reason for the 
desirability of money despite the fact of rapidly rising prices 
at the time must have been due to the fact that individuals 
perceived it a relatively riskless asset in the short run. ( 11) 
When the results for 1959-72 (Table 2) are compared with 
those for the period as a whole (Table 3 ), several differences 
appear. 
1. In general, the monetary impact is not as strong (based on 
r2 values). 
2. The monetary impact came sooner in the 1959-73 period 
with GM2 significant then, but not for the period as a whole. 
3. In general, the coefficient for money lagged one year was 
quite similar for both the periods (except when included in 
regressions with GM2). 
Tentatively there is no real evidence here that a fundamental 
structural shift occurred after 1972. Monetary variables seem 
to have played a predominant role in influencing the move-
ment in the country's price level before and after the oil price 
increases. 
Conclusion 
It is fair to say that in the 1970s most Iranians considered 
inflation to be an economic malady of sorts. This suggests 
approaching the study of inflation in the same way that the 
medical profession approaches the study of other diseases. One 
thing we can learn from them is that it pays to concentrate at 
first on certified, known, unambiguous causes of the disease. 
Based on the above analysis (8) of monetary movements, it is 
clear that any meaningful framework for the analysis of infla-
tion in Iran must systematically take into account the role of 
money in the economy. The link between real expenditures 
and monetary increases would seem to be the key element. Real 
demand in the country is determined in part by factors that 
depend on aggregate supply and in pai;t by factors that are 
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determined independently of supply. An approach along these 
lines might assume that the factors that bring demand and sup-
ply into balance are ultimately responsible for the economy's 
domestic price changes. 
It is interesting in retrospect that in nearly every year after 
1970, the Bank Markazi Iran (The Central Bank of Iran) Annual 
Report made some statement to the effect that inflation in the 
country was a problem of excess monetary demand. Typical of 
the bank's approach was the implicit application of Fisher's 
version of the quantity theory of money; i.e., in 1975 the bank 
noted that: (12) 
During recent years, due to the very speedy growth of 
income the total demand increased at a higher rate than 
total supply of goods and services. This situation not only 
resulted in creating new difficulties for the economy, but 
also increased inflationary pressures During recent years, 
especially in 1973, due to the expansionary financial 
activities of the Government and the speedy growth of 
credits extended by the private sector, the money supply 
and consequently the effective demand increased at a 
much higher rate than could be accommodated by domes-
tic production. 
We find in their reports, therefore, that the Bank accepted a 
model which usually implicitly but sometimes explicitly linked 
inflation with monetary factors. Furthermore, a careful reading 
of the Bank's reports leads one to conclude that its senior eco-
nomists tended to view the economy as one where aggregate 
demand was determined by factors' associated with Fisher's 
version of the quantity theory of money.(13) Specifically, in 
recommending policies designed to assure monetary stability, 
the Bank implicitly assumed that the economy's prices and 
wages were, for the most part, flexible. Stabilization measures 
suggested by the Bank at one time or another included: 
1. restrictive monetary policies 
_ 2. restrictions on government expenditures (mainly 
government consumption expenditures) 
3. reduction of import controls 
4. lower wage and salary adjustments (presumably 
limited to less than the previous year's inflation rate) 
Nowhere in the Bank's analysis of the country's inflation is 
there any evidence that its officials felt the underlying structure 
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of the economy prevented high and steady rates of economic 
growth with price stability, provided the proper monetary and 
fiscal policies were implemented. 
Ironically the Government's approach to stabilization of the 
price level apparently rejected this analysis and instead con-
sisted for the most part in the implementation of various anti-
profiteering campaigns involving direct state action. ( 14) For 
example in the 1975 anti-profiteering campaign more than 
250,000 businesses were briefly closed, over 8,000 shopkeepers 
were jailed, and another 23,000 shopkeepers and .merchants 
were sentenced to deportation (later rescinded to remote areas 
of the country.) 
Governmental measures in 1977 to reduce inflation through 
the imposition of credit controls set off a major deceleration of 
the industrialization program. As a result of this stabilization 
program, the construction industry, a major source of employ-
ment for unskilled rural labor, underwent a severe contraction 
in 1977 with the rural migrants as a whole suffering the greatest 
decline in living standards because of the continuing inflation. 
The bazaar merchants, dependent on state credits to finance 
many of their activities and affected by the inflation, came to 
feel by 1977 their economic role in society increasingly threat-
ened by the pattern of development that was gradually narrow-
ing their possibilities for private capital accumulation and 
upward social mobility. Finally, local industrialists joined the 
merchants to express their opposition to price controls, anti-
profiteering campaigns and an endless series of government 
decrees placing limits on capital accumulation and expansion. 
Little wonder the revolution saw a mass uprising against the 
regime. Given that the monetary sources of inflation were 
early the Central Bank, and that fairly easily implemented 
stabilization were then efforts suggested by the Bank (that most 
likely would have been successful), the question arises as to why 
the regime failed to take this advice into account and instead 
continued to proceed with various restrictive decrees and 
anti-profiteering campaigns. One answer has been suggested 
by Green: 
... mobilization systems create expectations that cannot 
possibly be met. Significantly, as we shall see in the 
Iranian case, a denial of participation can be linked with 
virtually any issue, whether it is pa.z:ticularistic or of wide 
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social consequences. High taxes, low income, inflation, 
repression, or unemployment can all be attributed to the 
absence of popular input into the state. The mobilization 
regime alerts a populace that there is such a thing as par· 
ticipation, that it is important and desirable, and perhaps 
most significantly, that this input is needed by the regime 
and will be subsequently sought. Such a process is self. 
defeating, for by its very nature a mobilization regime is 
unable to sanction or even assimilate potentially critical 
input without having to change its character - something 
such regimes generally resist. 
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